THE IRRESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDICIARY.
By ARDEMUS STEwART,

Esq.

It is one of the oldest and most firmly settled rules of the
common law, that a judicial officer is not liable to an action
for damages resulting from the doing of any act within his
jurisdiction, whether done bona fide, in the discharge of what
he honestly believed his duty, or done maliciously and from
a corrupt motive. If he had jurisdiction, he is secure. This
rule was adopted, as was said by Lord GIFFORD, in Miller v.
Hope, 2 Shaw, Sc. App. Cas. 125, since, if such an action
would lie, the judges would lose their independence, and the
absolute freedom and independence of the judges is necessary
for the administration of justice. HAWKINS, (P. C. b. I, c. 7,
p. 6,) states this reasoning a little more at length. "The
authority of government cannot be maintained," he says,
" unless the greatest credit be given to those who are so
highly entrusted with the administration of public justice, and
that if they should be exposed to the prosecution of those
whose partiality to their own causes would induce them to
think themselves injured, it wo uld be impossible for them to
keep up in the people that veneration of their persons, and
submission to their judgments, without which it is impossible
to execute the laws with vigor and success."
This rule has been followed with the greatest unanimity.
In Floyd v. Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 223, the judge and the grand
,ury were held not liable to be sued in the Star Chamber for
a conspiracy in respect of their acts in court, in convicting a
person of felony, In Hamond v. Howell, 2 Mod 219, a judge
who committed for an alleged contempt, under a warrant showing that in truth no contempt had been committed, was held not
liable in trespass, because he had jurisdiction over the question,
and his mistake in judgment was no cause of action. The same
was the basis of the decision in Cave v. .lAountain, I M. & G.
257, where the justice had committed the plaintiff on an infor383
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rnation which contained no legal evidence either of any offence,
or of the plaintiff's participation in that which was supposed
to be an offence. In Fray v. Blackburn, 3 B. & S. 576, the
judge was held not to be liable for having discharged a rule
taken by the plaintiff against the defendant for the payment of
costs. In Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L. R. Exch. 220, the defendant,
a county court judge, was held not to be liable to an action of
slander, for having said of the plaintiff, an accountant, then
defendant in a cause pending before the judge, "You are a
harpy, preying on the vitals of the poor." In Haggardv.
PelicierFrdres, [1892] A. C. 61, it was held that an action for
damages would not lie against the appellant, a judge of the
consular court of Madagascar, for dismissing without proof an
action which he held to be vexatious. And in the most
recent English case, Anderson v. Gorie, [1895] i Q. B. 668,
the judges of the Supreme Court of one of the colonies were
held not to be responsible in damages for committing the
plaintiff to prison in default of excessive bail, and refusing to
allow a habeas corpus to determine the validity of the committal.
Against this consensus of opinion there seems to have been,
in England, but one dissenting voice, and that but an obiter
dictum. In Thomas v. Chlurton, 2 B. & S. 475, Chief Justice
COCKBURN, declared: "I am reluctant to decide, and will not do
so until the question comes before me, that if a judge abuses
his judicial office, by using slanderous words maliciously and
without reasonable 6r probable cause, he is not to be liable to
an action." This is of course open to the criticism of Lord
ESHER, in Anderson v. Gorrie, [1895] I Q. B. 668, that he
was convinced "that had the question come before that learned
judge, he must and would, after considering the previous
authorities, have decided that the action would not lie;" but
it at least shows how strongly he felt the injustice of the rule
in its application to particular cases, and the necessity for
some qualification of it in order to secure suitors against the
malice or the venality of the court.
The one exception to this rule which has been allowed, is,
that the judge will be liable, if the matter in regard to which
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he is charged with having acted unjustly was one without his
jurisdiction. Yet even this has been emasculated by adding
the qvalification that he must have had the means of knowing
that it was not within his jurisdiction: Calder v. Halket, 3
Moore, P. C. 28. This was undoubtedly the true ground of
the decision in Gicynne v. Pool, 2 Lutw. 387, where the defendant was held not to be liable in trespass, although, as a judge
of an inferior court, he had caused the plaintiff to be arrested
in an action where the cause of action arose out of his jurisdiction; for, although the capias was issued without a previous
summons, and was not made returnable at a certain time, it
was held that he was justified, because he had acted as judge
in a matter over which he had reason to believe that he had
jurisdiction. The mistake as to jurisdiction, however, must
be one of fact, and not of law; and if a judicial officer, with
full knowledge of the facts, but under an erroneous impression
that he has jurisdiction, acts to the injury of another, an action
will lie against him : Holden v. Smith, i4 Q. B. 84.
This is the substance of the English decisions on this question ; and the same principles have been applied with practical
uranimity in the American cases. Of these, the leading case
is Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 282; affirmed in 9 Johns,
Mr. Yates, an officer in chancery, was com(N. Y.) 395.
mitted by Mr. Lansing, then chancellor, for malpractice and
contempt. One of the judges of the Supreme Court, on
habeas corpis, discharged Mr. Yates, whereupon the chancellor recommitted him for the same offence. Mr. Yates then
sued the chancellor for the penalty given by the Habeas
Co0,pus Act of New York, against any one who, should
knowingly recommit or imprison for the same offence, any
person thereby set at large; but the Supreme Court, in an
able and exhaustive opinion by Chief Justice KENT, held that
the Habeas Corpus Act did not intend to alter the rule as to
the immunity of judges from suit, and that the action would
not lie.
The same principle has been asserted in many other cases,
among others, in the recent ones of Harrison v. Redden,
(Kans.) 36 Pac. Rep. 325, and Fawcett v. Dole, (N. H.)
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29 Atl. Rep. 693.
In State v. Wlhitaker, 45 La. Ann. 1299;
S. C., 14 So. Rep. 66, it was held, that though a judge who
refuses to grant an appeal in an appealable case, on the
ground that the issues raised have been repeatedly determined
by the Supreme Court adversely to the party moving for the
appeal, and that the applicant was seeking to abuse the right
of appeal, acts injustifiably in so doing, yet, from motives of
public policy, he will be protected from liability for resulting
costs; and in .fombert v. Gleason, 14 N.Y. SuppI. 568, though
the mayor of a city refused to proceed with an examination
when the accused was brought before him, adjourned the
hearing to the following day, and held the accused to bail for
his appearance on that day; and then refused to accept the
bail tendered by the accused, or to accept any bail until after
twenty-four hours, and directed that the accused be locked up
until the following day; it was nevertheless decided that he
was not liable in damages for having acted thus.
It will be evident from a review of these cases that this rule
of the common law often fails to secure justice to a suitor;
and it will also be evident, on reflection, that it fails to secure
the very object for which, as we have seen, it was intended.
While securing the independence of the judges, it also secures
to them a license, which, in our days at least, they are not
slow to abuse. If judicial officers were always selected as
they ought to be, for their ability and probity, such protection
might indeed be beneficial to them and to others; but in a
state of society in. which men are raised to the bench as
a reward for their political services, even if those services have
involved a violation of the laws, and when incompetent judges
are continued in office from term to term, simply because they
are useful to their party, it is the public who need protection
against them, not they against the public. And descending
from generals to particulars, experience has shown that men
of this character wiil be sure to abuse the protection thus
afforded, for the gratification of their own private prejudices
and enmities. No clearer abuse of judicial power could be
shown, than in the cases from New York cited above, in which,
in the one case, a chancellor reimprisoned a person discharged
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-on habeas corpus, and a mayor refused either to examine or to
admit to bail a person brought before him as a committing
magistrate. Equally gross was the abuse in Anderson v.
Gorrie, [1895] i Q. B. 668, which was found by the jury to
be a fazt. And yet in all these cases, the guilty persons were
allowed to go scot-free, out of deference to a worm-eaten rule
of the common law. There was another instance of a flagrant
abuse of judicial power, which occurred some years ago, in
one of the United States. An attorney, who had rendered
very important services to a client in a suit over the estate of
a decedent, charged, on the settlement of that estate, a sum
which the court before which the matter came deemed
exorbitant, and, thereupon, instead of reducing it, that learned
body refused to allow him any fee whatever. He took an
appeal to the Supreme Court; but that, while mildly reproving the court below for its hastiness, said in effect:
This was a matter within its discretion. We are very sorry
for you, but we can't help you. So he might have gone
-without his fee, if it had not fortunately happened that his
client's share of the estate had been put into his hands. He
therefore quietly pocketed his fee, in spite of the court's decree.
Th.s coming to the ears of the opposing attorney, he thought
he saw an excellent chance for getting even with him, and lost
no time in informing the court. That august body then issued
.an attachment, or something of the kind, against the disobedient attorney, and would have done all sorts of things to him,
if several of the leaders of the bar had not offered themselves
as his advocates, which made them a little careful. All this
took place before the decision of the appeal, mentioned above;
and they decided to await that. After it was rendered, they
let the case drop. But, if they had not been fiightened, they
might have gone on and disbarred the attorney, cut him off
-from his profession, and ruined his life, without the slightest
responsibility therefor.
In regard to such facts as these, the oratory of Chief Justice KENT reads like a satire: " No man can foresee the
disastrous consequences of a precedent in favor of such a suit.
Whenever we subject the established courts of the land to the
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degradation of private prosecution, we subdue their independ-ence, and destroy their authority. Instead of being venerable
before the public they become contemptible; and we thereby
embolden the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in,
society, and to overturn those institutions which have hitherto
been deemed the best guardians of civil liberty."
The good Chief Justice lived in a different age from ours.
The bench was venerable then; and it was capable of being
degraded. But no private prosecution can degrade a court
where the judge sits and reads a newspaper, with his feet on
the desk, his mouth full of tobacco, and a spittoon by his side,
during the transaction of business; nor one where the judge
pats his fat paunch and curses the hours that separate him
from dinner, growing more snappish and less mindful of lawas his appetite grows; nor one where the judge allows his.
views of a client's rights to be distorted by his hatred of the
counsel; nor one where the judge presides over, the trial of a.
case in which his bitterest enemy is interested. Yet there is
not a state in the Union where scenes like these are not to,
be seen almost daily, and where the grossest injustice is not
perpetrated by such means, without any adequate remedy.
Remedies there are, to be sure; but wholly inadequate..
Of what use is it to ask a new trial of a court that refused to.
give you a fair one before? Of what use is it to appeal to a
higher court, whose composition is no better, perhaps worse,
than that of the court below? And of what use is it to
impeach a judge, put in office for political reasons, and kept
there by his political influence? Who could successfully
impeach a Democratic judge in Texas, a Republican judge in
Pennsylvania, or a Dispensary Judge in South .Carolina?The idea is almost too absurd to mention.
The only possible solutions of the problem, therefore, if we
would improve the administration of justice, are, either (i) To
elect to the bench only men of the highest character, in which
case no redress will be needed, for no wrong will be done; or
(2) To make the judges responsible to the party injured for
any damage that may be caused by their corrupt or malicious
actions on the bench.

